

Nicolas Andres Figueroa Gonzalez

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Pontificia Universidad Católica
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PERSONAL DATA Full Name: Nicolas Andres Figueroa Gonzalez
Date of Birth: April 29, 1976
Place of Birth: Santiago, Chile
Nationality: Chilean
Actual Position: Assistant Professor Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

RESEARCH INTERESTS Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Microeconomic Theory

STUDIES **University of Minnesota**, Minnesota, USA

Ph.D. in Economics July 2006.

- Thesis's subject: Two Essays in Mechanism Design
- Advisor: Marcel Richter.

Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Ingeniero Civil Matemático, July 2000.

- Thesis's Subject: Some Stochastic Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
- Advisor: Roberto Cominetti.

Licenciatura en Ciencias de la Ingeniería, mención Matemática, 1999.

GRANTS **Núcleo Milenio (as young researcher)**, Information and Coordination in Networks, years 2011-2014.

Instituto Milenio (as young researcher), Complex Engineering Systems, years 2007-2011.

Fondecyt (as main researcher), Mechanism Design: Beyond Monotonicity, years 2014-2016.

Fondecyt (as main researcher), Procurement Mechanisms: Cost Reduction, Incentives to Investment and Barriers to Entry, years 2008-2010.

Fondecyt (as coinvestigator), An analysis of the procurement mechanism for public defenders: moral hazard and criminal supply, years 2007-2008.

Fondecyt (as coinvestigator), Incentives, Reputation and Teachers' Quality, years 2011-2012.

AWARDS **Dissertation Fellowship**, Graduate School, University of Minnesota, years 2005-2006.

"Presidente de la Republica" Scholarship, MIDEPLAN, Chile, years 2000-2003.

Outstanding student award, Escuela de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad de Chile, years 1996-1997 and 1999.

Academic Excellence Fellowship, Escuela de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad de Chile, year 1994.

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Main Professor

- Industrial Organization.
- Microeconomics II.
- Real Analysis.
- Microeconomic Theory III

2011-present

Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Main Professor

- Industrial Organization.
- Advanced Microeconomics for Masters.
- Auction Theory.
- Mechanism Design.
- Informational Asymmetries in Macroeconomic Models.
- Advanced Microeconomics.

2006-2011

University of Minnesota, Minnesota, USA.

Main Professor

- Game Theory, Fall 2004.
- Industrial Organization, Fall 2003 and Spring 2004
- Mathematical Economics, Spring 2003.
- Principles of Macroeconomics, Summer 2002-2004.

2002-2005

Teaching Assistant

- Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2000 and Spring 2001.
- Microeconomic Analysis, Fall 2001 and Spring 2002.
- Economic Integration of the Americas, Fall 2002.

2000-2002

MASTER'S
STUDENTS

Gonzalo Cisternas (Assistant Professor at MIT Sloan School of Business)
Jorge Lemus (fifth year Ph.D. student at Northwestern)
Jorge Catepillán (fourth year Ph.D. student at Northwestern)
Carlos Ramírez (fourth year Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon University (Finance))
Jorge Vásquez (third year Ph.D. student at Wisconsin)
Tibor Heumann (second year Ph.D. student at Yale)
Diego Vega (second year Ph.D. student at Olin Business School)
Nicolás Inostroza (first year Ph.D. student at Northwestern)

PUBLICATIONS

The Role of Optimal Threats in Auction Design (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Journal of Economic Theory* 144(2), March 2009, 884-897.

A Note on Optimal Auctions (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Economics Letters* 102(3), March 2009, 169-173.

On the Planner's Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design (with José Correa). *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, 5814 (2009), pp. 72-84. (Proceedings of SAGT 2009)

Optimal Allocation mechanisms with Single-dimensional Private Information (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Review of Economic Design* 15(3), 2011, 213-243.

Asymmetric Partnerships (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Economics Letters* 115(2), May 2012, 268-271.

Pricing with Markups in Industries with Increasing Marginal Costs (with José Correa, Roger Ledermann and Nicolás Stier-Moses). *Mathematical Programming*, forthcoming.

- WORKING PAPERS *What to Put on the Table.* (with Vasiliki Skreta). Revise and Resubmit, second round.
- Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions* (with Gonzalo Cisternas). Revise and Resubmit.
- Contracts as a Barrier to Entry* (with Enrique Ide and Juan Pablo Montero). Revise and Resubmit.
- Loyalty Inducing Programs and Competition with Homogeneous Goods* (with Sebastián Infante and Ronald Fischer).
- Regulation under Incomplete Information: Prices versus Quantities* (with Leonardo Basso and Jorge Vásquez).
- Mechanism design without the Single-Crossing Condition* (with Tibor Heumann).
- Contracts with Sabotage* (with Joaquín Poblete).
- CONGRESS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
- Contracts as a Barrier to Entry.* North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Minneapolis. USA. June 2014.
- Monopoly Pricing Under Incomplete Information: Prices v/s Quantities.* Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, México City. México. November 2013.
- Monopoly Pricing Under Incomplete Information: Prices v/s Quantities.* Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Lima. Perú. November 2012.
- Does the Market for Innovation Lead to a Division of Labor? Evidence From the Market for Patents.* SECHI, Viña del Mar. Chile. September 2012
- Auctions, Negotiations and Information Acquisition.* 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Istanbul. July 2012
- Procuring Legal Services Through Decentralized Contracting.* Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago. Chile. November 2011.
- Auctions with an Ex-Post Negotiation.* Workshop in Economic Theory of the Econometric Society. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. December 2010.
- Auctions with an Ex-Post Negotiation.* SECHI, Talca, Chile. September 2010.
- Procuring Legal Services Through Decentralized Contracting.* Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Buenos Aires. Argentina. October 2009.
- On the Planners Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design.* SAGT, Paphos, Cyprus. October 2009.
- What to Put on the Table.* SECHI, Antofagasta, Chile. September 2009.
- Loyalty Inducing Programs and Competition with Homogeneous Goods.* North American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Boston, MA. USA. July 2009.
- On the Planner's loss due to Lack of Information.* SECHI, Viña del Mar, Chile, September 2008.
- Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions.* GAMES, Evanston, IL. USA.

July 2008.

Efficient Regulations for Wholesale Electricity Markets. SECHI, Viña del Mar, Chile, September 2007.

Bargaining over Multiple Issues. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society. Ciudad de México, México, November 2006.

Bargaining over Multiple Issues. SECHI, La Serena, Chile, September 2006.

An Optimal Auction with Type-Dependent Externalities. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society. Santiago, Chile, July 2004.

Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities. Clarence W. Tow Conference on Auctions. Iowa, May 2004.

REFEREEING
ACTIVITY

Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, Journal of Banking and Finance, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Political Economic Theory, Review of Economic Design, Social Choice and Welfare, Management Science and Operations Management.